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Is the flavor of mint reducible to the minty smell, the taste, and the menthol-like coolness on the roof 
of one’s mouth, or does it include something over and above these – something not properly 
associated with any one of the contributing senses? More generally, are there features of perceptual 
experiences – so-called novel features – that are not associated with any of the standard Aristotelian 
senses (vision, audition, touch, taste, and smell) taken singly (the flavor of mint being one of the 
prime candidates for such features)? This question has received a lot of attention of late.1 Yet 
surprisingly little attention has been paid to the question of what it means to say that a feature is 
associated with a modality in the first place.2 Indeed, there is only one fully developed proposal in 
the literature (O’Callaghan, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2017). I argue that this proposal is too permissive to 
inform the debate over novel features. I go on to argue that all attempts to formulate a better proposal 
along these lines fail. The corollary of my arguments is that the question of the existence of novel 
features is poorly formed. Furthermore, the problem generalizes, with the result we should not rely 
on our pre-theoretical notions of the senses as the basis of theorizing about the features (contents and 
phenomenal character) of perceptual experiences. 
 
 
1 See Bayne (2014), Briscoe (2016a, 2016b, 2019), Connolly (2014), Fulkerson (2014a), Macpherson (2011a), 
O’Callaghan (2008, 2012, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2017a, 2017b, 2019). See Spence and Bayne (2014) for a critical 
look at the evidence for multisensory experiences (with or without novel features).  
2 A bit more, but still too little, attention has been paid to another unresolved problem that undermines the attempt to 
answer this question – namely, that there is no uncontroversial demarcation of the senses on which to base these 
associations. While I focus on the problem of feature association, I will engage with the further problem of 
individuating the senses to the extent necessary to address that first problem (see, especially, section 4.2). 
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1. Background and Significance 
The philosophy of perception has come a long way in the last two decades. As recently as 1999 one 
could be forgiven for confusing the philosophy of perception with the philosophy of vision, but since 
then great strides have been taken to broaden our perspective, first opening new avenues for 
philosophical research into the senses of hearing, taste, smell, and touch, and now beginning to 
transcend the boundaries of these senses themselves. We are now able to ask questions like the one 
with which I began: Are there distinctively multisensory (i.e., novel) features of perceptual 
experiences? In what follows I will argue that this progress has not taken us far enough. Multisensory 
approaches to perception retain the inheritance of the earlier sense-by-sense approach, and this 
inheritance impedes further progress in the philosophy of perception. 
 When we take the senses one at a time, the complexities introduced by their interactions 
aren’t salient, and it is easy to think that our intuitive associations of features with these senses are 
unproblematic (and exhaustive). Unfortunately, this unreflective reliance on intuitive feature 
associations is still evident in much of the discussion of multisensory experience. Bayne (2014) is 
representative here. After acknowledging that there is no clear rule for associating a given feature of 
a perceptual experience with a sense and that there is no general agreement on how to individuate the 
senses, he remarks, “I will (largely) set [these issues] to one side here. As we will see, significant 
progress can be made in evaluating the decomposition thesis by relying only on our intuitive sense of 
how to individuate experiences” (p. 16). (The decomposition thesis is the claim that there are no 
novel features, and by “individuate experiences” Bayne means carve a perceptual experience up into 
sense-specific components – i.e., assign features of the experience to one or another of the 
Aristotelian senses – insofar as is possible.) But it is exactly at the interactions of the senses that the 
relevant intuitions start to break down. We need some other basis for associating features with the 
senses to properly undertake the multisensory account of perception. 
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 O’Callaghan is alone in offering a thoroughgoing feature association rule.3 As we shall see, 
though, his proposal won’t actually settle the novel feature question. Furthermore, no proposal will. 
Indeed, no proposal can even deliver all the uncontroversial associations of features with our 
intuitive, pre-theoretical understandings of the Aristotelian senses – at least not in a way that is 
otherwise adequate for settling the novel feature question. The lesson I draw is that our pre-
theoretical notions of the senses, in terms of which the novel feature debate is couched, are an 
inadequate basis for theorizing about the content and phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience.4 Though I focus on the novel feature debate, this point holds for any debate concerning 
the content or phenomenology of perceptual experience (e.g., intentionalism,5 the thick/thin contents 
of experience debate, cognitive penetration, etc.). I recommend that we abandon the last vestiges of 
the sense-by-sense approach. Instead, we should focus on the contributions of the relevant perceptual 
mechanisms to perceptual experience, without worrying over how these mechanisms relate to our 
pre-theoretical notions of the (Aristotelian) senses. (More on mechanisms and senses below.) As the 
novel feature debate is my point of entry, the first step will be to get a clearer understanding of what 
these novel features are. It is to this that I now turn. 
 
2. Novel Features 
 
3 Others have recently adopted O’Callaghan’s proposal (e.g., Briscoe 2019), but none have held it up to scrutiny as I 
shall do. Fulkerson (2011, 2014) proposes his own partial rule based in feature binding. By his own admission, 
though, binding is “at best a sufficient condition” for features to be associated with a given modality (2014b, p. 34). 
Adjudicating the novel feature debate requires a complete remedy. So I will set Fulkerson’s proposal aside (but see 
n.44). 
4 I follow the dialectic of the novel feature debate in speaking of perceptual experiences. While the experience/sub-
experiential distinction does seem to be at play in explaining some of the intuitions I discuss, all that will matter for 
my arguments – particularly with respect to perceptual contents – is that the intuitions regarding the Aristotelian 
senses are what they are. 
5 The problem is especially salient for intramodal intentionalists, who claim that perceptual phenomenology 
supervenes on content+modality (e.g., Crane 2003, 2007; Lycan 1996). See Bourget (2017) and O’Dea (2006) for 
reasons why novel features pose a problem for intramodal intentionalism. 
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Novel features are features of a perceptual experience that are not properly associated with any 
Aristotelian sense (pre-theoretically understood) – vision, audition, touch, taste, or smell.6 Rather, 
they arise due to the operation of multiple senses working together.7 The relevant features are simple 
features of both the phenomenal character and representational content of the perceptual experience. 
When I speak of features, I will mean such simple features. (Sometimes the literature focuses solely 
on phenomenal features, other times both, and sometimes it is ambiguous between the two. I will 
consider both.) Note, also, that the Aristotelian senses are exteroceptive – they inform us about the 
external environment. Novel features – if there are any – are features of experiences by which we 
encounter our environment. The novel feature debate does not address features of interoceptive 
experiences, which inform us of states of our own body (such as hunger or pain). Novel features fall 
into two classes:8 
i. Mere novel feature instances: Features of a perceptual experience that, while they can 
in some circumstances be associated with experience in just one sensory modality, only 
appear as a feature of the given experience due to the coordinated operation of at least 
two distinct sensory modalities. 
 
6 An anonymous reviewer for this journal pointed out the intriguing possibility of features that are mistakenly 
attributed to a modality. Such features are either: (a) features that ought to be associated with one modality but are, 
due to interaction of the two senses, apparently associated with another (see Spence (2016) on oral referral as a 
potential instance of this) or (b) features that aren’t properly associated with any modality but are mistakenly 
thought to be. Features of type (a) would not be novel. Features of (b) would be novel. Making sense of mistaken 
feature associations will, of course, depend on a rule for associating features with modalities – just as understanding 
novel features does. 
7 And the modalities involved should suffice for the resulting experience to include the novel feature. Being a bit of 
pine wood is not a novel feature of an experience in which one picks up a stick and smells it to ascertain what sort of 
wood it is because, though one needs the olfactory input along with visual and/or tactile input for the experience to 
include that property in its contents, one will also need cognitive inputs (e.g., a PINE concept) for this property to 
work into the contents of the experience. 
8 This distinction was introduced and further developed by O’Callaghan (2014a, 2015, 2017). The term ‘novel 
feature’ is his. 
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ii. Novel feature types: Features of a perceptual experience that are never associated with a 
modality; they can only appear as a feature of a perceptual experience due to the 
coordinated operation of at least two distinct sensory modalities. 
Relations, the relata of which are perceived by different modalities, are the paradigm candidates for 
mere novel feature instances – e.g., the temporal relation between the sight of a baseball player’s foot 
touching third base and the sound of the ball striking the third baseman’s mitt used by an umpire to 
determine whether the runner makes it safely to third. Other candidates include cross-modally 
perceived gestalts, such as a rhythm articulated by alternating flashes and beeps.9 A standard 
candidate for a novel feature type is flavor, as distinct from taste, where olfactory receptors interact 
with stimulation of the taste buds and input from the trigeminal nerve (by which we sense, e.g., the 
coolness of the mint or the heat of a chili pepper) to deliver an experience that is not (supposedly) 
reducible to the contributions of each of these, individually.10 Another candidate is intermodal feature 
binding awareness – where features associated with different senses are experienced as bound 
together in a single perceptual object and the unity of the multisensory perceptual object is a feature 
of the experience (the putative novel feature).11 
 It has been suggested that there is a distinct flavor modality (e.g., Stevenson 2009). The 
proposed modality encompasses taste, smell, trigeminal tactile stimulation, and (in some cases) 
vision. Without ruling on the propriety of treating such a system as a distinct sensory modality, we 
can note that such a modality is not one of the Aristotelian senses in terms of which the novel feature 
debate is conducted. Nor do we have any pre-theoretical notion of this flavor sense – it is a 
 
9 O’Callaghan (2015) offers an extensive discussion of cross-modal gestalts in the context of the novel features 
debate; for a skeptical take see Spence (2015a). 
10 See, e.g., Connolly (2014) and O’Callaghan (2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2017, 2019) for (somewhat guarded) defenses 
of flavor as a novel feature type. For more on the various inputs to flavor perception see Auvray and Spence (2008), 
Spence (2015b). Again, Spence and Bayne (2014) offer reason to doubt that we have multisensory experiences, 
including the experience of multisensory objects. See also Spence and Frings (2020) for a discussion of one 
particular approach to multisensory feature integration. 
11 See especially O’Callaghan (2014a). 
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theoretical posit. Any dispute between someone who claims that flavor includes novel features and 
one who claims that, while there are features involved in flavor experience beyond those supplied by 
taste, smell, and trigeminal stimulation, these are properly associated with a further (theoretical) 
flavor sense is merely verbal. This demonstrates the need for an agreed upon set of senses against 
which to evaluate novel features. In the novel feature debate, the Aristotelian senses play this role. 
 It is also important to mark a distinction made within this literature between cross-modal 
interactions between the (Aristotelian) senses and properly multisensory effects. Here is O’Callaghan 
on the matter: “one sense could causally but not constitutively impact another. And sensory processes 
might interact while every aspect of perceptual experience remains associated with some specific 
modality or another. So, despite all the cross-talk, conscious perceptual experience might remain 
modality specific” (2015, p. 134). Standard examples of such cross-modal interactions without novel 
features are recalibration effects of the sort that generate illusions like the McGurk effect and the 
ventriloquism effect. 
 In the McGurk effect, participants are presented with a video display of someone mouthing 
the syllable /ga/ onto which is dubbed the sound of someone pronouncing /ba/. Subjects report 
hearing /da/ even after they are made aware of the illusion. In the ventriloquism effect, a visual 
stimulus leads to a change in the apparent location of a sound.12 The effect gets its name from the 
experience of hearing a ventriloquist’s voice as coming from her dummy’s mouth (because the 
ventriloquist’s mouth doesn’t move but the dummy’s does). To give a more modern example: when 
watching a movie while wearing headphones, we experience the voices of the characters on the 
screen as coming from the mouths of those characters, not as coming from somewhere between our 
ears (Callan et al. 2015). 
 
12 The term ‘ventriloquism effect’ is sometimes used in a broader sense to include the spatial capture of audition by 
any other sense (see Caclin, Soto-Faraco, Kingstone, and Spence 2002). I will focus on the audiovisual 
ventriloquism effect described above. 
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 These illusions are the result of sub-experiential interactions between the senses. Such 
interactions resolve discrepancies between the senses when they carry conflicting information about 
some feature of the environment or allow one modality to inherit information from another modality, 
where the second modality has a greater acuity or is more reliable with respect to that class of 
information. For instance, vision has greater spatial acuity than audition – at least for stimuli 
projected onto the fovea (a cone-rich structure of the retina onto which the center of the visual field is 
focused). When auditory and foveal visual stimulation are attributed to a common source, the 
localization of the visual stimulus dominates audition, conferring the more precise visual location on 
the sound. This recalibration of information leads to a corresponding alteration in the 
phenomenology and content of the perceptual experience. In ordinary circumstances such 
recalibration tends to increase the reliability of the senses. However, in irregular circumstances – 
such as those in which the illusions arise – these interactions can lead to errors. 
 The thought, widely endorsed in the novel features literature, is that such causal interactions 
do not result in novel features.13 A feature of a perceptual experience can still be associated with a 
single modality even when it is produced by more than one mechanism. If we classified features as 
multisensory strictly by the mechanisms that produce them, then nearly all the features of perceptual 
experience would be multisensory because causal interactions among the sensory mechanisms 
(insofar as we can assign them to pre-theoretical notions of the senses) are pervasive, as noted by 
O’Callaghan, above.14 While this is a perfectly legitimate practice – one common in the sciences – it 
 
13 Cf. Bayne (2014), with respect to contents. See Connolly (2014) for a reply. One might also push back on this 
claim by noting that cross-modal illusions do induce some meta-cognitive uncertainty about the reliability of the 
experience (Deroy, Spence, and Noppeney 2016). However, the uncertainty is not a feature of the first order 
experience itself; it is an assessment of the reliability of that first order experience. (We don’t hear that there is 
uncertainty, we have uncertainty about what we hear.) Since novel features, if there are any, are features of the 
perceptual experience, metacognitive uncertainty won’t undermine the intuition that cross-modal illusions don’t 
produce novel features. 
14 See Driver and Noesselt (2008), Ghazanfar and Schroeder (2006), Schroeder and Foxe (2005), Shimojo and 
Shams (2001). 
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deviates dramatically from that of partisans in the novel feature debate, with their reliance on the pre-
theoretical notions of the Aristotelian senses as the basis for classifying sensory features. 
 But, of course, to classify a feature as novel we will need some account of what it is for a 
feature (e.g., some particular color phenomenology) to be associated with a sensory modality (e.g., 
vision). As we saw with Bayne, above, philosophers debating the existence of novel features have 
generally relied on intuitive answers to this question (e.g., intuitions about the proper sensibles of a 
modality – those features that are perceivable by that modality and no others). But this approach will 
do no better, for the purposes of the novel feature debate, than the scientific approach detailed above. 
The appeal to such intuitions cannot settle the debate, since the features about which there is a 
dispute are precisely those about which intuitions diverge. If we are going to make any headway, we 
will need some other way of associating features with sensory modalities. 
The challenge is to draw the distinction between a causal impact and a constitutive impact in 
such a way that these intuitions are respected. It is very appealing to think that it should be drawn in 
terms of the features that the modified modality might produce on its own. A causal impact won’t – 
the thought goes – exceed these bounds while a constitutive impact (yielding a novel feature) will. 
This is the thought behind O’Callaghan’s proposed association rule, which we will examine shortly. 
Before we can assess that rule, we are going to need some criteria by which to judge it. 
 
3. Constraining the association rule 
Any acceptable association rule must meet certain constraints. For instance, if the rule is going to be 
useful in assessing whether or not there are novel features, (1) it will have to tell us, for any given 
feature and sensory modality, whether or not that feature is associated with that modality. And (2) the 
associations the rule delivers must conform to certain intuitive associations of features with 
modalities. A rule that associates colors with smell and not with vision is not a good rule. Also (3) 
the rule must not prematurely trivialize the novel feature debate: We must not be able to read the 
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existence or non-existence of novel features right off the rule. (A rule with, e.g., a final clause, 
“otherwise the feature is to be associated with vision”, does not satisfy this constraint.) And the novel 
features the rule allows should have independent theoretical interest. More generally, it must not 
render the debate unsubstantive. 
 The intuitive associations of the second constraint that I shall focus on concern (a) proper 
sensibles and (b) merely causal influences of one sense on another. With respect to (a), these are 
features that are intuitively associated with only one sensory modality. Color, for instance, is a 
feature of visual experience but not of olfaction, audition, touch, or taste. Similarly, pitch, timbre, 
and loudness are proper sensibles of audition; odors are proper sensibles of smell, and so on. The 
way I am using proper sensibles here applies both to features of content and phenomenal character. 
The relevant intuitions regarding (b)-type cases are just those concerning causal interactions, 
including cross-modal illusions, discussed in the prior section. A perceptual experience will contain 
no novel features due to these effects, not even mere novel feature instances. The impacted features 
are associated with the modality of the perceptual object that instantiates them – e.g., the illusory 
sound localization in the ventriloquism effect is associated with audition, not vision. These intuitions 
need to be respected if we are going to capture the pre-theoretical notions of the senses at play in the 
novel feature debate. 
 There is one more constraint, which will require a brief argument: (4) The association must 
be grounded in an appeal to the stimulation states of the sensory mechanisms of our modalities. In 
particular, the rule must appeal to the stimulation states of the mechanism of the modality with which 
the given feature is associated.15 Sensory mechanisms (the sensory organs, the portion of the nervous 
system connecting them to the brain, and the brain regions involved in processing inputs received 
 
15 If you are already satisfied that explanations of the contents and phenomenal character of perception ultimately 
need to be grounded in the physical (e.g., stimulation states of sensory receptors and subsequent neural processing), 
then you can skip the remainder of this section. 
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from the sensory organs) and stimuli are two of the four axes along which theorizing about sensory 
modalities occurs. The other two are representational content/worldly features perceived and the 
phenomenal character of the perceptual experience – the very sorts of things novel features are. 
(These criteria were codified by Grice (1962).) So, for any sensory modality there will be a 
mechanism that responds to some characteristic stimulus (e.g., light), a set of phenomenal features, 
and a set of contents ascribed to that senses. Any attempt to associate features with sensory 
modalities straightaway in terms of the content of the perceptual experience or its phenomenal 
character (or the two in combination) will be inadequate for present purposes. Here’s why: 
 We need to distinguish between mere groupings of (simple) features of a perceptual 
experience and groupings that amount to the set of features properly associated with a given sensory 
modality. This will require an account of what a modality is. For the purposes of the novel feature 
debate, the relevant modalities need to correspond to the pre-theoretical notions of the Aristotelian 
senses – vision, audition, taste, smell, touch. If we restrict ourselves to features of the experience in 
giving our account of the modalities, we will need to appeal to relations between these features. It 
won’t do to merely stipulate associations – we would need to presume the very thing at issue in order 
to meet the first constraint. The difficulty is finding relations that don’t appeal to anything beyond the 
features themselves and that don’t beg the question either for or against novel features. 
 While some have argued that the proper approach to individuating the senses is to focus on 
content, phenomenology, or both, these proposal are not made with the novel features debate in 
mind.16 For their part, partisans in the novel feature debate have generally sidestepped the issue of 
individuating the senses (see the quote from Bayne, above). So, what might be said for the content 
and/or phenomenology approach to individuating the senses for the purposes of adjudicating the 
novel feature debate?  
 
16 The closest account we get is that of Richardson (2014). Richardson addresses causal influences of one sense on 
another, but not the possibility of novel features. 
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 We might try individuating the Aristotelian senses in terms of discrete phenomenal continua 
– e.g., color or pitch – in terms of which a notion of phenomenal similarity could be spelled out. But 
doing so leaves us with too many senses – e.g., a pitch sense, a timbre sense, a color sense, etc. Or 
we might try an appeal to dependencies between such features, letting the senses be the collections of 
interdependent features. For instance, we only see colors if we see them qualifying some shape (or 
spatial expanse), so color and (a certain kind of) shape content/phenomenology belong to the same 
sense (vision). However, this won’t tell you which non-dependent features ought to be associated 
with a sensory modality, but we need an association of such non-dependent features to ground our 
associations of the dependent features.17 
 Or we might try individuating the Aristotelian senses by phenomenology/content pairs. But 
we will still need a reason to pick certain pairings and not others. It is not the case that an experience 
with a particular content necessarily has a given phenomenology. For instance, we can have a 
perceptual experience with the content that there is a circle accompanied by either visual or tactile 
phenomenology. The question is why the one pairing should count as visual and the other as tactile.18 
It won’t be because the visual phenomenology is grouped along one phenomenal continuum and the 
tactile another, since we will have to include multiple continua in each sense (see above). We need 
some further reason to include/exclude the relevant continuum in/from the sense in question. We 
can’t appeal to dependences to group the relevant continua into a sense (e.g., one can only see the 
color of the circle if one has the visual sort of circle phenomenology) without some prior rule for 
 
17 And there are features that, while not seeming to ground any further associations, are non-dependent and are 
intuitively associated with an Aristotelian sense – e.g., silence is associated with audition and empty space is 
associated with multiple senses: I can see the space between two objects, or I can feel the empty space in front of me 
when I have my hand about. 
18 The point applies to experience with non-perceptual contents, too. I could be thinking about circles (or whatever 
else) while looking at a blank wall. Why shouldn’t the intuitively non-perceptual content get paired with some 
perceptual phenomenology and, on the strength of that pairing, be associated with one of our sensory modalities? 
Presumably we distinguish perceptual contents from non-perceptual contents because the former, and not the latter, 
are the result of a perceptual mechanism. But this has us appealing to mechanisms, so it can’t be the answer for the 
content/phenomenology pairing approach. 
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grouping the non-dependent features. But there don’t appear to be any other relations between 
features of a perceptual experience that could make the difference of a sense.19 
 So we can’t give an adequate account of the sensory modalities (for present purposes) in 
terms of just the content and phenomenal character of an experience. Fortunately, we can appeal to 
Grice’s other two criteria, mechanisms and stimulation, in formulating our association rule – 
individuating the senses by sensory mechanisms and using the stimulation states of the mechanisms 
as the basis of associations of features with modalities – namely, the modalities responsible for the 
production of those features.20 Hence the fourth constraint on our association rule. 
 
4. O’Callaghan’s association rule and some morals drawn from it 
4.1. O’Callaghan’s rule 
O’Callaghan has offered an association rule that, at first blush, seems to satisfy this fourth constraint: 
“for each perceptual experience of a given modality, the [features] it instantiates that [are] associated 
with that modality on that occasion [include] only that which a corresponding [unimodal] experience 
of that modality could have” (2014b, p. 152).21 He defines “corresponding experiences” as 
experiences resulting from an equivalent stimulus (2014b, p. 152). O’Callaghan understands 
unimodal experience in terms of mechanisms, suggesting that we get a fix on a unimodal experience 
by considering what is left once we subtract the contributions of the mechanisms associated with the 
other sensory modalities (2014b, p. 145). More formally, for an instance of a feature F of a 
perceptual experience E resulting from a stimulus R: 
 
19 If you are inclined to respond with an appeal to the relative determinacy of visual v. tactile shape discrimination, 
substitute this example: We can feel and see the location of a pin prick on our fingertip. 
20 Since mechanisms are partially defined in terms of their response to stimuli, there is no disentangling the two. 
There are proposals that don’t rely, directly, on Grice’s criteria (esp. Nudds 2004) but appeal to conventions – e.g., 
those features count as visual that we conventionally associate with vision. However, such accounts – by their own 
admission – won’t deliver unambiguous verdicts in the controversial cases. 
21 O’Callaghan’s formulation focuses only on phenomenal features. I adjust it here to include content. 
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(OCR) That instance of F is associated with a given modality if, and only if, a corresponding 
instance of F could be a feature of a unimodal experience E’, in that modality, resulting 
from stimulation by R.22 
 
So, the smell of coffee brewing, when part of a perceptual experience including the sight of bread in 
the toaster, the feel of a jar of jam in your hand, the sound of coffee percolating, etc., will belong to 
olfaction because, were we to isolate olfaction, ruling out any input from the other modalities, and 
present it with exactly the same scene, the resulting experience would include the smell of the coffee 
brewing. But the sound of the coffee percolating would not be associated with olfaction because 
olfaction would presumably not, in the presence of that same total stimulus, deliver the sound of 
percolating coffee. It is clear what OCR excludes: If a feature instance is to be assigned to a 
modality, its production cannot require concurrent stimulations outside the characteristic sensory 
inputs to that modality. But what about (i) past stimulations in another modality, as when one now 
“sees” the heat of an ember thanks to learned correlations between heat and a red glow? And what 
about (ii) inputs that are not stimulations at all, such as an innate Kantian spatial form of intuition? 
 Until these questions are answered OCR cannot satisfy our first constraint.23 It does not tell 
us for any given feature instance and for each modality whether or not the feature instance is 
associated with that modality.24 With respect to (i), for instance, we learn to hear the elevation of a 
 
22 All the proposed rules should be read as relativized to normally functioning sensory mechanisms. Notice, also, 
that the rules are formulated in terms of feature instances. A novel feature type will be one with no instances that are 
associated with any modality. We can say that a feature type is associated with a modality if some unimodal 
experience of that modality instantiates that feature. Finally, recognize that the association relation cannot be a 
function – we must leave open the possibility that a feature is associated with more than one modality if we are to 
accommodate common sensibles. It might be that the association relation is a function for phenomenal features, but 
that is a substantive philosophical thesis that is more often assumed than argued for. 
23 To be fair, O'Callaghan (2014b) does discuss the problem of learned correlations, drawing a distinction between 
two kinds of unimodal experience: pure and mere experiences of a modality. The former are perceptual experiences 
had by a creature whose past and present experiences have only been in that modality. The latter are those had by a 
creature whose experience is presently, but not historically, restricted to that modality. O’Callaghan inclines towards 
‘yes’. Others – most notably Strawson (1959) in his discussion of sounds and a ‘no space world’ – have said ‘no’. 
De Vignemont’s (2014) multimodal account of bodily awareness also depends on a ‘no’ answer. O’Callaghan does 
not discuss stimulus-independent inputs. 
24 One might also worry that there is no uncontroversial way of individuating the senses and, so, no way of 
identifying what, say, vision is – let alone what features should be associated with it (Coady 1974; Fulkerson 2014c; 
Gray 2013; Grice 1962; Heil 1983; Keeley 2002; Macpherson 2011b, 2011c, 2014; Matthen 2015; Nelkin 1990; 
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sound by correlating the effects of the outer ear on the waveform of the sound – which differ with 
elevation – with visual input regarding the elevation of sound sources. Whether or not we include this 
correlation as part of the input to the unimodal experience will determine whether or not we should 
associate sound elevation with audition according to OCR. 
 The problem is even worse for (ii). Whatever could have been supplied (in terms of content 
or phenomenal character) by the other senses could be supplied by such inputs. There could be, e.g., 
an innate correlation between waveform effects and sound elevation that does just what the learned 
correlation discussed above does. And if that is possible, subtracting vision (or any other modality) 
won’t shed any light on the deliverances of unimodal audition according to OCR. Likewise for all the 
other modalities. For instance, there could be an innate correlation between the smell of coffee 
brewing and the sound of a percolator, in which case OCR would associate the sound with olfaction. 
(I will have more to say about problems resulting from the use of ‘could’ below.) 
 The lesson is that we will have to take a stance on what is and is not actually part of/an input 
to the mechanism responding to the stimulus and giving rise to the experience (including any learned 
correlations and non-sensory inputs) before we can successfully apply an association rule based in an 
individuation of the senses by those mechanisms. Before proceeding to further attempts at an 
association rule, some remarks about these sensory mechanisms are in order. 
 
4.2. Comments regarding mechanisms and modalities 
 
Nudds 2004; Roxbee-Cox 1970). However, the cases considered in the individuation of the senses literature concern 
determinable senses – the sort of senses that might be shared by creatures with differing sensory mechanisms and 
capacities associated with that sense (e.g., a sense of vision that can be had by humans, bees, and pit vipers). The 
novel feature debate, on the other hand, concerns a characterization of our experiences. If we focus just on the 
(relatively) determinate senses that we, as a species, share (as O’Callaghan does in his discussion), we might get a 
workable individuation of the Aristotelian senses. (I borrow the determinate/determinable sense distinction from 
O’Callaghan (2019, chapter 6).) 
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The preceding discussion should alert us to the fact that we do not have uncontroversial intuitions 
about the exact extent of the sensory mechanisms of the Aristotelian senses.25 This suggests that 
there are multiple intuitively acceptable ways of demarcating these mechanisms. This poses a 
problem for the novel feature debate because differences in demarcation will lead to differences in 
feature associations.26 And these differences are most likely to arise with respect to the controversial 
feature association, including those concerning putative novel features. For instance, one acceptable 
demarcation might associate contested flavor features with taste while another doesn’t associate it 
with any of our Aristotelian senses. But the debate presumes that there will be an unqualified answer 
to the question ‘are there novel features?’ We will need a criterion for selecting a preferred 
demarcation of the mechanisms of a given Aristotelian sense if we are to get our unqualified answer. 
 Here we can press our association rule into service. The idea is that candidate demarcations 
will be evaluated with respect to their ability to deliver the right verdict regarding our guiding feature 
association intuitions from constraint (2), among others. (These other intuitions – call them 
secondary intuitions – will be intuitive feature associations that we would like to retain if we can, but 
which we are willing to give up to save more central intuitions.) In order to do this, though, we need 
to settle on the right association rule – and that requires having clearly demarcated mechanisms for 
the rule to operate on. We need the rule to pick the demarcation, but we need the demarcation to pick 
the rule. 
 The key, to resolving this difficulty, is finding some equilibrium between intuitions regarding 
feature associations and intuitions regarding the mechanisms of the Aristotelian senses. Returning to 
 
25 Indeed, it isn’t entirely clear whether or not cognitive inputs ought to be included in the sensory mechanisms, not 
least because it isn’t clear where the line between perception and cognition should be drawn. If cognitive resources 
are required in order to give rise to experience, then they will certainly be involved in the relevant mechanisms. 
Specifying which cognitive resources are included will have ramifications for the debates over rich/thin contents of 
perceptual experience and cognitive penetration. 
26 In developing his sensory pluralism, Fulkerson (2014c) notes that different individuations (chosen for different 
purposes) will give different results for different experiences. He doesn’t question that there will be some 
individuation of the senses that will be acceptable for answering the general question that is in dispute in the novel 
feature debate. (See Macpherson 2011b, 2011c for a similar sensory pluralist view.) 
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our second constraint on the association rule – that it must satisfy certain guiding feature association 
intuitions – we can add the qualification: provided the notion of a modality that you feed into it 
satisfies guiding intuitions about that modality. It is no mark against an association rule that it 
associates colors with olfaction if the relevant notion of olfaction includes retinal stimulation. 
 Fortunately, though they don’t decide what to say about inputs of type (i) and (ii), our 
intuitions concerning the mechanisms of the Aristotelian senses do not leave us entirely at sea. For 
instance, it is uncontroversial that each of those senses has primary receptors (e.g., retinas for vision, 
the basilar membrane for audition, etc.27) that are tuned to a particular class of energy (e.g., light, 
pressure waves, etc.) and that the primary receptors of a given sense are not part of the mechanisms 
of the other senses.28 These intuitions are linked to, but not dependent on, the feature association 
intuitions of constraint (2). Regarding the intuition that the proper sensibles are associated with only 
one sensory modality, color is a proper sensible of vision because color is the sort of thing that is 
only detectable by the primary receptors of vision. Similarly, the paradigmatic instances of 
recalibration effects, including the McGurk and ventriloquism effects, require stimulation of the 
primary receptors of multiple modalities.  
(It has been shown that mental imagery can induce cross-modal illusions – e.g., that an 
imagined visual stimulus can induce the ventriloquism effect (Berger and Ehrsson 2013). However, 
this does not impact the primary receptor intuition any more than our ability to imagine a color while 
receiving no visual stimulation does. The primary receptor intuition is linked to the proper sensible 
and recalibration effect intuitions only with respect to their paradigmatic instances – i.e., those 
 
27 Things get a little trickier for the other senses but, I think, not unbearably so. 
28 We might think that this gives us an alternative rule: A feature of a perceptual experience is associated with a 
given modality just in case we lose those features of the experience in a corresponding situation differing only in 
that there is no stimulation of the primary receptor. However, this test won’t work. Consider the McGurk effect: If 
we omit stimulation of the basilar membrane (primary auditory receptor), we lose /da/ phenomenology (i.e., the 
sound of someone pronouncing /da/), so this feature is associated with audition. But if we omit retinal stimulation, 
we also lose that phenomenology, so it will also be associated with vision. But intuitively, /da/ phenomenology 
should only be associated with audition. 
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resulting from occurrent stimulation of the senses involved. And it does not depend on these feature 
association intuitions even in the paradigmatic instances. If anything, the order of explanation goes 
the other way around. The primary receptor intuition is not affected at all by the existence of non-
paradigmatic instances of the effects, such as those involving mental imagery.)29 
 So, any acceptable candidate for the preferred demarcation of the sensory mechanisms to be 
used in adjudicating the novel feature debate will need to conform to our intuitions regarding 
primary receptors of the Aristotelian senses. With one further (safe) assumption – namely, that we 
don’t have stimulus-independent resources for duplicating the information about our environment 
that the primary receptors would capture in a given circumstance, were they active (whether or not 
they are) – we can assess how our rules fare with respect to our intuitions concerning proper 
sensibles and the McGurk and ventriloquism effects using a general notion of an acceptable 
demarcation – a placeholder demarcation on which the primary receptor condition and the safe 
assumption are satisfied.  
 The goal is to find a rule that can deliver these intuitions for the general notion of an 
acceptable demarcation of the mechanisms of the Aristotelian senses. Once we have the rule in hand, 
we can use it to find our preferred demarcation by testing the acceptable candidate demarcations with 
respect to their ability to deliver our secondary intuitions. In short, we find our rule using the 
generalized acceptable demarcations of the Aristotelian senses, and then we us our rule to find the 
preferred demarcation of the mechanism of each of those senses. 
One might worry that, even with an association rule in hand, there will still be equally good 
candidates for the preferred demarcation that deliver different verdicts with respect to specific novel 
features. Be that as it may, without an association rule there is no hope for a resolution to the novel 
 
29 Such imagery is another non-stimulus input of the sort discussed in relation to OCR, above. It remains an open 
question whether or not the mechanisms of imagery ought to be included in those of one of our Aristotelian senses 
and, relatedly, whether or not imagery is properly thought of as perceptual. Settling the question will have 
consequences for applications of the association rules to follow. 
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feature debate. With a rule some hope remains, so it behooves us to make the effort to find an 
adequate association rule.  
 We have already seen that the rule must operate on clearly demarcated sensory mechanisms, 
so the dimensions along which the proposed rules can vary are: what counts as a result of the 
stimulation states of a mechanism and how much we allow the stimulus to deviate from the actual 
stimulus in a counterfactual unimodal experience. In what follows I consider a series of 
modifications to OCR, each of which differs from its predecessor by a minimal adjustment in one or 
the other of these dimensions, thereby covering all the plausible ways of formulating an association 
rule. As we shall see, none of these attempts succeed, so the worry above never gets off the ground. 
(Tables summarizing the rules and how they fare with respect to the four constraints are included in 
the appendix.) 
 
5. Revising the association rule 
5.1. Could and would in determinate sensory mechanisms 
Let’s first modify OCR so that it will distinguish between our candidate demarcations of the 
mechanisms of a given sense. For an instance of a feature F of a perceptual experience E resulting 
from the stimulation of the sensory mechanisms M1,…, Mn by a (total) stimulus R: 
(RR1) That instance of F is associated with the modality individuated by Mm if, and only if, 
were just Mm stimulated by R, a corresponding instance of F could be a feature of the 
resulting experience E’. 
 
According to RR1 we will be able say that, if Mm is an auditory mechanism that includes learned 
correlations by which waveform effects can convey information about elevation, the experience of 
the elevation of a sound will be associated with audition. If Mm does not include the learned 
correlation (or an innate proxy thereof), sound elevation will not be associated with audition. That is 
an improvement over OCR. 
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 However, the phenomenal features that could result from a unimodal experience under 
equivalent stimulation will not be as constrained as we want. Some deaf musicians, for instance, are 
able to distinguish pitch by tactile sensation of a vibrating surface (the surface being vibrated by or 
being the source of a sound wave). The resulting experience – or any tactile experience of a vibrating 
surface, for that matter – could have the phenomenal character we associate with pitch rather than the 
characteristic feel of a vibrating surface. But then RR1 associates features that ought to be proper 
sensibles (e.g., pitch phenomenology) with more than one modality (e.g., audition and touch), in 
violation of one of our guiding intuitions from constraint (2) on an acceptable association rule.30 RR1 
is too promiscuous in its associations. 
 We can avoid this promiscuity by considering only what would result from the actual, 
determinate sensory mechanisms of the subject: 
(RR2) That instance of F is associated with the modality individuated by Mm if, and only if, 
were just Mm stimulated by R, a corresponding instance of F would be a feature of the 
resulting experience E’. 
 
This corrects for our tactile pitch phenomenology. We wouldn’t have pitch phenomenology arising 
from tactile vibrations given the sensory mechanisms we actually have (on an acceptable 
demarcation of the tactile mechanism). However, given the restriction to the exact stimulus, R, in the 
counterfactual situation, there will be no way of capturing intuitions regarding recalibration effects. If 
the mechanism delivers a given feature only because of the influence of another mechanism, then 
that feature would not be contributed by the unimodal mechanism under that stimulation.  
 For example, we cannot attribute any phoneme content/phenomenology to audition in the 
McGurk effect because the unimodal auditory mechanism would not, under equivalent stimulation 
 
30 While there is some evidence, from a select number of long-time users of sensory substitution devices, that 
stimulation in one modality can result in some rudimentary phenomenology characteristic of another, this is due to 
recruiting resources of the latter modality to the processing of input to the former, in which case we are dealing with 
a different mechanism (one including the recruited resources) than the one with which we began (the ordinary touch 
mechanisms). The point here is that no acceptable demarcation of the ordinary mechanism of touch has, as a matter 
of fact, the ability to produce pitch phenomenology on its own, though it is conceivable that it could. 
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result in /da/ content/phenomenology. That requires stimulation of the primary receptors of the visual 
mechanism as well. We will need to loosen the association rule if we are to capture the guiding 
intuition that the altered phoneme phenomenology/content in the McGurk effect is auditory. 
 
5.2. Loosening constraints on the stimulus 
Perhaps we should loosen the restriction on the stimulus to something like ‘a substantially similar 
stimulus’ (assuming this can be made sufficiently precise to avoid violating our first constraint). This 
would give us, for an instance of a feature F of a perceptual experience E resulting from the 
stimulation of the sensory mechanisms M1,…, Mn by a (total) stimulus R: 
(RR3) That instance of F is associated with the modality individuated by Mm if, and only if, there 
is some stimulus R’ that is substantially similar to R and, were just Mm stimulated by R’, 
the resulting experience E’ would have a corresponding instance of F. 
 
The idea here is to associate features with the mechanisms that would produce them under some 
similar stimulation, privileging unimodal mechanisms.31 For instance, any acceptable auditory 
mechanism is capable of giving rise to an experience representing /da/ and providing the phenomenal 
features we associate with the pronunciation of that syllable. So, we can class /da/ experiences as 
auditory, even when they are produced by a multimodal mechanism, provided the stimulus that 
would result in unimodal /da/ experience counts as substantially similar to the stimulus of that 
multimodal mechanism. 
 But there is a problem. Consider the following: I see what looks like a speckled (flat) wall 
while also feeling that the wall is rough with my hand. Had the bumps on the wall been slightly 
 
31 Alternatively, you might think that a feature will be associated with a modality just in case it is one of the 
disjuncts in the disjunction of possible features resulting from the actual stimulus state of that modality’s mechanism 
plus whatever effects can be generated on its output by the other mechanisms under a range of stimulation. Such a 
rule will need a non-question begging means of identifying the experiential results of a causal influence of one 
mechanism on another to avoid associating every feature of the experience with each modality. This will require a 
fuller specification of the dependencies of phenomenal features on informational content carried by the sensory 
mechanisms. See §5.3 for reasons to think this won’t help adjudicate the novel feature debate. 
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higher or had the lighting come from a slightly different angle, the wall would have visually appeared 
rough. RR3 will correctly associate the content that the wall before me is rough with touch; but it 
will also associate that content (incorrectly) with vision because, were I presented (in a unimodal 
visual experience) with a substantially similar stimulus that differed just in the height of the bumps or 
the angle of the light, I would visually experience the content that the wall is rough. 32 On the other 
hand, RR3 will not ascribe tactile roughness phenomenology to vision because the tactile 
phenomenology isn’t the sort of phenomenology that (any acceptable notion of) vision would have 
from our substantially similar visual stimulus. The point is that RR3 does not do well with respect to 
the contents of the experience, at least where the contents concern common sensibles.33 Fortunately, 
there are other approaches to identifying the content of a perceptual experience,34 so I will set 
contents aside and focus on an association rule that works for phenomenal features for the remainder 
of the paper. 
 However, RR3 also gives us the wrong results with respect to the phenomenology of 
ventriloquism effect experiences because the effect does not merely relocate the sound, it makes the 
localization more precise. And this is not restricted to the ventriloquism effect. In general, sound 
localization phenomenology resulting from the stimulation of just the auditory mechanism will not be 
as refined as sound localization phenomenology resulting from the auditory mechanism when aided 
 
32 This result doesn’t depend on any resolution of the conflict between information carried by the visual and tactile 
mechanisms, as in work on the visual dominance of touch (Rock and Victor 1964; Rock and Harris 1967). It 
depends on the fact that there is a possible stimulus similar to the actual stimulus that would make a content 
accessible to vision that is only accessible through touch in the actual experience – i.e., the visual mechanism plays 
no part in contributing that content to the original experience. 
33 This is not to say that the test could not be salvaged for content. Perhaps one could make a response along the 
lines of Nudds’s (2009) distinction in the determinateness of experiences of common sensibles perceived with 
different modalities or an appeal to the total content characterizing the experience in which the content in question is 
embedded. Or perhaps we could try to restrict ‘substantially similar’ to rule out these cases. But these will require 
taking on theoretical commitments that might not pan out. 
34 E.g., naturalized accounts of intentionality such as Dretske (1981, 1988, 1995), Millikan (1984), Neander (2017), 
Papineau (1984), Shea (2018). 
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by foveal visual input.35 But then, if we just consider an experience resulting from substantially 
similar stimulation of the auditory mechanism alone, we won’t get sound localization 
phenomenology as in the actual experience. We will get a much less precise localization. So, the 
localization of the sound will not be associated with audition according to RR3, contrary to our 
intuitions. The same is true of every recalibratory cross-modal mechanism in which one of the 
mechanisms is more finely tuned than the other but we want to associate the resulting (phenomenal) 
feature with the latter modality.36 
 It will be no help to loosen our restriction on the stimulus further, by dropping the similarity 
requirement and leaving the stimulus unconstrained: 
(RR4) That instance of F is associated with the modality individuated by Mm if, and only if, there 
is some stimulus R’ such that, were just Mm stimulated by R’, the resulting experience E’ 
would have a corresponding instance of F. 
 
We still get the same result with respect to vision-assisted sound localization because no stimulus 
impinging on the auditory mechanism alone can give the fine-grained sound spatialization that arises 
from the recalibration of sound localization by foveal visual input to the auditory mechanism. 
Furthermore, this rule associates all the common sensibles in a given experience with every modality 
that is able to give rise to them, whether or not they do so in that experience. RR4 is decidedly worse 
than RR3. 
 One might be inclined, at this point, to bite the bullet and abandon our guiding intuitions 
regarding the ventriloquism effect and other precision increasing sensory interactions. However, it is 
unclear why we should allow the retreat to substantially similar stimulation to save the McGurk 
intuition but not allow a retreat to a substantially similar, but less precise, result to save the 
 
35 See Battaglia, et al. (2003), King (2009), and especially Bizley and King (2008). See Blauert (1997, pp. 193-196) 
for an overview. For a presentation of the most precise spatial information available to audition from purely auditory 
cues, see Shinn-Cunningham, et al (2000). 
36 Such recalibration for greater precision does not presuppose greater accuracy, as the case of the ventriloquism 
effect should make clear. 
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ventriloquism intuition. Pending a compelling reason for the asymmetry, we ought to see if we can 
revise our association rule so that it captures both intuitions. The next section attempts to spell out 
just how we ought to do this. 
 
5.3. Loosening what counts as a result 
Perhaps there is some profit to be gained by considering the differences between the ventriloquism 
effect and a case where RR3 arguably gets things right with respect to novel features, flavor. Flavor 
experience (allegedly) contains novel feature types whereas the ventriloquism effect experience 
merely evinces increased precision with respect to a unimodally available feature type (sound 
localization phenomenology). The flavor/taste distinction is, supposedly, a difference in kind. The 
ventriloquism effect (and ordinary visually enhanced auditory localization, generally) reveals a 
difference in degree. 
 But RR3 cannot capture this distinction because it is bound by those features that the 
unimodal mechanism – however demarcated – would deliver on its own. We have no room left to 
maneuver with respect to either stimulus or mechanism. This suggests that we need to loosen our 
requirement on the features that would result from substantially similar stimulation. But we will need 
to do so in a way that does not wind up attributing too much to the modality.37 A first pass at the 
required modification would be to associate features of a perceptual experience with a modality that 
either would produce them, under some substantially similar stimulation, or would produce a feature 
that is a determinate of the same determinable as the initial feature – a determinable being a relatively 
indeterminate property (e.g., color) and a determinate of a determinable being a more specific 
property in the range of the determinable (e.g., blue). Determinates of a given determinable can, 
 
37 Having already seen that the rule must operate on determinate mechanisms and that no loosening of the variation 
in the simulation between the actual and the counterfactual situations will, on its own, get us an acceptable rule, this 
is all that is left to us. 
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themselves, be determinables with yet more specific determinates (e.g., azure). (The appeal to 
determinates/determinables is a more general way of capturing difference in degree/kind alluded to 
above.) So, for an instance of a feature F of an experience E resulting from the stimulation of the 
sensory mechanisms M1,…, Mn by a stimulus R: 
(RR5) That instance of F is associated with the modality individuated by Mm if, and only if, there 
is some stimulus R’ that is substantially similar to R and, were just Mm stimulated by R’, 
the resulting experience E’ would either: 
(a) have a corresponding instance of F or 
(b) have a corresponding instance of a feature F’ that is a determinate of the same 
determinable as F. 
 
RR5 does save the ventriloquism intuition, but it runs afoul of one of our other constraints: (b) 
introduces an opportunity for features to become associated with a modality despite the mechanism 
of that modality not being involved in the production of that feature. This is a straightforward 
violation of the fourth constraint. 
 To illustrate the problem, it will be useful to appeal to a hypothetical case that allows us to 
abstract away from the difficulties posed by our own, complicated perceptual systems. Imagine a 
race of aliens very much like us except that they have evolved such that they ordinarily experience a 
form of lexical-gustatory synesthesia. When they hear names in their home language, they have 
concurrent taste phenomenology of some sort of sugary soft drink, a different one for each name. 
(They evolved to have this synesthesia because it is, for them, conducive to social bonding.38) For the 
purposes of this example, we will include whatever mechanisms are necessary to produce the 
synesthetic taste phenomenology in this alien race’s auditory mechanism. (This will still count as an 
acceptable demarcation of audition because stimulation of the primary receptors of their gustatory 
mechanism is not necessary for the synesthetic taste phenomenology.) Furthermore, let us stipulate 
that there are no other relevant interactions between these and the other senses complicating the case. 
 
38 Also note that, for these aliens, taste – at least in the range of tastes of sugary soft drinks – is not a proper sensible. 
Nothing in the example depends on this, nor does this case rely on the feature association intuitions of constraint (2). 
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In sum: these aliens have auditory mechanisms that produce taste phenomenology in a narrow range 
(sugary soft drink tastes) when they hear names, and there are no other relevant interactions between 
their senses in producing their auditory and gustatory experiences. Otherwise they are just like us. 
 Now suppose that one of these aliens, Lexi, visits earth, settles in California, learns English 
and assimilates with human society there. Furthermore, ‘Joan’ turns out to be a name in Lexi’s home 
language, one resulting in a synesthetic experience of the taste of root beer. No other English words 
or names are names in her language. 
One day Lexi is drinking coffee when her friend Gus says, “June is always gloomy in Los 
Angeles”. (In terms of RR5, this total scene, including the coffee drinking and Gus’s utterance, is the 
stimulus R). When Lexi hears “June” she has no synesthetic taste phenomenology – it is not one of 
the names that triggers her synesthesia. But she does experience the taste of coffee (RR5’s F, in this 
case) because she is, in fact, drinking coffee. However, the sound of “June” is very similar to 
“Joan”.39 So there is a stimulus (R’) – namely, Gus uttering “Joan is always gloomy in Los Angeles” 
while everything else remains as it is in R – that is substantially similar to the original stimulus and 
that would result, under unimodal stimulation of Lexi’s auditory mechanism, in a corresponding 
feature (F’) – the taste of root beer – that is a determinate of the same determinable (phenomenal 
taste) as the coffee taste she is actually experiencing. Therefore, all the conditions on the right side of 
RR5 are satisfied, delivering the verdict that the coffee taste is associated with audition. Yet Lexi’s 
auditory mechanism has nothing to do with her tasting coffee. Her synesthesia never produces the 
taste of coffee. So this verdict violates constraint (4).40 
 Of course, one could respond that we have latched on to the wrong determinable. The 
relevant determinable is just the range of tastes that Lexi’s auditory system, when properly 
 
39 If you don’t find ‘Joan’ and ‘June’ sufficiently similar, substitute the French (and alien) name ‘Jeune’ for ‘Joan’. 
40 This conclusion follows even if there are no creatures that work according to the stipulations we have introduced 
to describe Lexi. The point is simply that the rule is not adequately tied to the mechanisms that produce the features 
to be associated. 
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stimulated, can produce in her – namely, sweet soft drink tastes. That would rule out coffee. But this 
just points to a further worry; namely, that we can carve determinables more or less finely, with 
different ways of doing so giving different associations according to RR5. We need a way of picking 
out the relevant determinable. 
 The response in the preceding paragraph – that the objection relies on using the wrong 
determinable – is based in the intuition that the relevant determinable is fixed by the range of the 
mechanism in question (e.g., the range of taste phenomenology that Lexi can experience from 
stimulation of her auditory mechanism). Adding this restriction to RR5 would certainly help resolve 
the violation of the fourth constraint, but hewing too closely to the capacities of the mechanism in 
question is what caused our problem with the ventriloquism effect (or any visually assisted auditory 
localization) with respect to RR3 and RR4: The auditory mechanism lacks the spatial resolution of 
(foveal) vision-supported auditory localization, so (foveal) vision-supported localization 
phenomenology will fall outside the range of the relevant determinable. That means that we cannot 
associate the localization of the sound with audition, contrary to our intuition. If we don’t restrict 
ourselves to the range of the determinable deliverable by the mechanism in question, we risk 
throwing ourselves back on the problem of selecting the relevant determinable (as we just saw). 
There is a middle way: restricting the determinable to the range of features that the subject’s sensory 
mechanisms can, individually, supply.41 However, this won’t fix RR5’s rulings in Lexi’s case. The 
taste of coffee is deliverable by one of Lexi’s sensory mechanisms; namely, the gustatory 
mechanism. We are going to need a more nuanced approach. 
 In particular, we need a notion of feature inheritance – conditions under which a modality can 
take on a feature of another modality. With the notion of inheritance properly spelled out, we will be 
able to fix on the relevant determinable (according to our middle way) and accommodate the 
 
41 To drop the restriction to the deliverances of the individual mechanisms would be make novel features impossible, 
in violation of the third condition on our association rule. 
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ventriloquism effect and Lexi intuitions. The idea is that, in the ventriloquism case sound localization 
is inherited but in Lexi’s case coffee taste is not. So inheritance constrains the appeal to shared 
determinables in clause (b), bringing it in line with constraint (4).  
In a proper instance of inheritance, the original stimulus (R) would not result in a unimodal 
experience of the inherited determinate (F) in the inheriting modality. We can narrow this further, 
given that clause (a) will capture any instances of the determinate that would result from some 
substantially similar stimulation: Inheritance involves determinates of a unimodally accessible 
determinable that wouldn’t result from a substantially similar stimulus (R’). Furthermore, inherited 
features are inherited from some other mechanism that can produce them in a unimodal experience.42 
For example, when the visual localization of a trumpet is bound to an auditory object (the sound of 
the trumpet) in (foveal) vision-assisted sound localization, the localization – which is too precise to 
have been supplied by a unimodal auditory experience – is supplied by vision and inherited by 
audition. By contrast, Lexi’s coffee taste phenomenology is not inherited by audition – it is just a 
straightforward result of her taste mechanism. 
It is not necessary that the inherited feature be a feature of an object in the parent modality in 
the original experience (i.e., that (a) is satisfied for the parent modality), though this is typically so. 
Restricting inheritance in this way would present problems. First, it can’t accommodate the intuition 
that hemifield neglect patients experiencing the ventriloquism effect on their neglected side inherit 
the localization of the sound from vision (because there is no corresponding visual experience). 
(Hemifield neglect patients are susceptible to both the McGurk and the ventriloquism effects even 
when the visual stimulus is presented to their contralesional side and so, presumably, without any 
accompanying visual phenomenology (Bertelson et al. 2000; Leo et al. 2008; Soroker et al. 1995a, 
 
42 For the sake of thoroughness, we should acknowledge the possibility of chains of inheritance – e.g., one modality 
inheriting a feature from a mechanism that inherited the feature from yet a third mechanism. At some point chains of 
inheritance will need to bottom out in a mechanism that has non-derivatively supplied the feature. 
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1995b).) Also, some recalibration effects persist even after the contributor modality stops receiving 
stimulation.43  
The appeal to shared determinables also constrains inheritance. In particular, it captures the 
idea that we don’t inherit features arbitrarily – e.g., we don’t have experiences of green sounds and 
circular smells. And the restriction to a corresponding instance of a shared determinable captures the 
idea that instances of inheritance involve the inherited feature (F) overwriting a feature (F’) of the 
given perceptual object that would have been produced under substantially similar unimodal 
stimulation. This overwriting follows from the fact that the feature inherited (F) is a determinate of 
the same determinable as is the unimodally available feature (F’). Determinates of the same 
determinable are incompatible – an object cannot be both entirely red and entirely blue. Adding this 
notion of inheritance to RR5, we get: 
(RR6) That instance of F is associated with the modality individuated by Mm if, and only if, there 
is some stimulus R’ that is substantially similar to R and, were just Mm stimulated by R’, 
the resulting experience E’ would either: 
(a) have a corresponding instance of F or  
(b) have a corresponding instance of a feature, F’, that is a determinate of the same 
determinable as F, provided that 
 (i) Mm inherits the instance of F from some other mechanism Mk in E. 
 
RR6 seems to get the verdict right in the ventriloquism effect – we will say exactly the same thing 
about it as we did about the localization of the sound of the trumpet, above. And it certainly gets the 
right verdict with respect to Lexi’s case. The taste of coffee is not inherited by audition – Lexi 
doesn’t experience the coffee taste because her auditory mechanism inherited the feature from her 
gustatory mechanisms. She tastes the coffee as a result of the operation of her gustatory mechanism, 
itself. Notice, though, that we can say this in Lexi’s case because we stipulated that there were no 
complicating interactions between the senses. Real life cases will require empirical facts to determine 
 
43 How the coordination of perceptual objects across modalities actually goes will be addressed in more detail 
below. 
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when a mechanism does and doesn’t inherit a feature from another. And this is going to lead to a 
problem for RR6. 
 Consider the justification on offer for treating the ventriloquism effect localization 
phenomenology as auditory: A feature (localization) is bound to an auditory object (a sound), where 
that feature was inherited from vision. Without the empirical details regarding the interactions of the 
visual and auditory mechanisms, we have to fall back on our intuitions about which perceptual 
objects belong to which sensory modalities. But we (intuitively) identify perceptual objects with a 
modality because we associate their perceptible features with that modality. This has us going in a 
tight circle: A feature instance is associated with audition because it is instantiated in an auditory 
object, and a perceptual object is auditory because the features it instantiates are associated with 
audition.44 We will need something other than an appeal to the intuitive association of perceptual 
objects with a modality to get us a non-circular justification for associating inherited features with the 
inheriting modality. It can’t just be that binding an initially visually supplied feature to an intuitively 
auditory object can, by itself, justify calling that feature auditory. After all, we haven’t ruled out 
cross-modal objects – i.e., perceptual objects with features intuitively associated with different 
sensory modalities. We will need to dig beneath the phenomenal surface to understand why there is 
feature inheritance in the hope that this will provide a justification for associating the phenomenal 
feature with the inheriting modality. That is, we need to explain RR6’s clause (i) in terms of the 
mechanisms responsible for feature inheritance. Barring this, we still have not fully satisfied 
constraint (4). 
 
44 This circularity worry is noted by Fulkerson with respect to his binding-based feature association condition (2014, 
p. 38). He attempts to block the worry by appeal, in part, to proper sensibles: Given an antecedent association of 
proper sensibles to modalities, we can type perceptual objects by the proper sensibles they contain and then group 
any other features that are bound to that object according the modality of the object. This might be sufficient for his 
purpose, which is to show that haptic touch is unisensory. However, it won’t help our case: We are seeking a 
thorough going association rule that will tell us, among other things, which sensory modalities the proper sensibles 
belong to. But that is the very thing Fulkerson assumes. 
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 So what happens in one of these instances of inheritance? Conflicting determinates of the 
same determinable are pre-experientially attributed to (proto-)perceptual objects of different 
modalities. Perceptual objects, here, are bundles of bound features by which we encounter objective 
particulars. We can, for instance, be visually aware of some features of a thing and tactilely aware of 
others. The bundle of bound tactile features will be the tactile object, those of the visual features the 
visual object.45 (This doesn’t require an ontologically robust thing that is the perceptual object.) If the 
resolution of this conflict yields a feature that could not have been supplied by one of the modalities 
being taken on as a feature of one of that modality’s objects, then we have a proper instance of 
inheritance. (Otherwise, we have mere recalibration.46) 
But why should there be a conflict, given the fact that these are features of different 
perceptual objects? Because perceptual objects can be of the same objective particular (as in the look 
and feel of the cup in my hand) or of objects that are intimately related (as are sounds and their 
sources), such that having a determinate of a shared determinable in the one entails the same 
determinate in the other. We get conflicts when there is a clash of determinates in perceptual objects 
so related.47 To recognize such instances there has to be some pre-experiential mechanism linking 
objects and features across modalities and resolving apparent conflicts. This suggests that sub-
experiential information sharing across modalities underwrites inheritance. 
 If informational content is contributed to some mechanism and that mechanism uses that 
content in the determination of the phenomenal features of its perceptual objects, then we will have a 
justification for associating the phenomenal feature with the inheriting modality. This justification 
 
45 As noted above, this sort of intuitive classification of perceptual objects leads to a circularity worry, if it is to be 
used in associating perceptual features with sensory modalities. A better way of typing perceptual objects by 
modality is to do so in terms of the mechanisms that produce them (by binding features into those perceptual 
objects). Perceptual objects typed in this way can factor in a rule for associating features with modalities (see 
below). 
46 Notice that the basic mechanism for mere recalibration and inheritance is the same, which supports treating the 
McGurk and ventriloquism effects as broadly similar. Inheritance is a special case of recalibration. 
47 The sub-experiential recognition of this sort of relation between (proto-)perceptual objects is called the ‘unity 
assumption’ in the empirical literature. See Chen and Spence (2017) for a review. 
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avoids the circularity worry while explaining the intuitive pull of the idea that, e.g., a feature of an 
auditory object ought to be associated with audition. It also gives us a better grip on why features 
aren’t inherited arbitrarily: it is not adaptive to inherit features if there is no conflicting information 
to reconcile (e.g., no acceptable demarcation of the auditory mechanisms carries information 
regarding wavelength reflectance, so no conflict with vision can arise on this front).48 Notice, too, 
that the justification doesn’t require that there be an instance of the relevant feature associated with 
the parent modality in the experience, only that the mechanism of the parent modality carry the sort 
of information that can be used to determine instances of the feature in the perceptual processing 
eventuating in the experience. This solves the problems from the ventriloquism effect in hemifield 
neglect patients and the persistence of recalibration once the parent mechanism is no longer receiving 
stimulation.  
The key point, though, is that it is not phenomenology that is inherited, in the first instance, but 
information.49 Inheritance occurs sub-experientially, before any phenomenology arises. This leaves 
room for the modality to do some work in determining the phenomenal features, thereby justifying 
the claim that these features are properly associated with the modality.50 But even if informational 
content, alone, determines the feature instance, we can justify associating the feature with the 
 
48 Of course, it is possible that there are non-adaptive inheritance-like phenomena that we might want to capture 
under the label “inheritance”. I have no strong leanings as to whether the resulting features should be associated with 
the “inheritor” mechanism. If so, then we can drop the shared determinable restriction in clause (b). Whether or not 
the feature satisfies the shared determinable restriction simply sorts the normal (adaptive) instances of inheritance 
from the odd ones.   
49 Mm ‘inherits information’ when it receives informational input from Mk that (partially) determines an instance of 
F, where no unimodal stimulation of Mm would carry that information and where Mk does carry that information in 
the sub-experiential processing resulting in E, either non-derivatively or through a chain of inheritance bottoming 
out in a mechanism that carries the information non-derivatively. 
50 On this view the content might be associated with one (or more) modality, the resulting phenomenology with 
another. For example, we might continue to associate the localization content inherited, in the ventriloquism effect, 
with vision while associating the localization phenomenology with audition. This can accommodate a view like that 
of Bayne (2014) on which the contents of perceptual experiences involving sensory integration are multisensory 
while maintaining our guiding intuitions with respect to phenomenal features. 
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inheritor modality due to its uptake of the information in the formation of its own perceptual objects. 
Incorporating this into our association rule, we get: 
(RR7) That instance of F is associated with the modality individuated by Mm if, and only if, 
there is some stimulus R’ that is substantially similar to R and, were just Mm stimulated 
by R’, the resulting experience E’ would either:  
(a) have a corresponding instance of F or  
(b) have a corresponding instance of a feature F’ that is a determinate of the same 
determinable as F, provided that 
(i) Mm inherits information from some other mechanism Mk in the course of 
sub-experiential sensory processing (resulting in E) and 
(ii) Mm uses that information in determining the instance of F (in E), as a 
feature of one of Mm’s perceptual objects. 
 
RR7 retains the advantages of RR6 while solving the circularity problem – it bases inheritance in the 
operation of the sensory mechanisms, forestalling the need to appeal to intuitions about the modality 
of perceptual objects/features in its application. However, in accepting this association rule, we lose 
something. Our previous versions of the rule make the sorting of phenomenal features empirically 
tractable – at least in principle – without requiring us to take on any theoretical commitments 
concerning the basis of the phenomenal features of perceptual experiences. We simply demarcate our 
mechanisms, isolate them, see what phenomenal features result from their stimulation, and compare 
with the phenomenal features of the original experience.  
 RR7, on the other hand, requires us to take a stand on what content a given mechanism has at 
various points in the course of processing a given stimulus and to endorse the supervenience of 
phenomenology on informational content. And once we have settled on a story that allows us to 
associate contents with mechanisms – and accepting the supervenience thesis – we will have to settle 
the further question concerning the point in the flow of information at which phenomenology 
emerges.  
 None of this is trivial, but until these issues are sorted RR7 will not rule on a large number of 
features. Furthermore, there is a problem lurking in RR7. To illustrate: Suppose Lexi takes a sip of 
root beer just as Gus says, “Joan is always gloomy in Los Angeles”. RR7 will associate the root beer 
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taste phenomenology with both taste and audition by clause (a) because unimodal sensory 
stimulation in either modality would have resulted in that phenomenology. But imagine two ways 
Lexi’s synesthesia might operate: (1) When Lexi’s synesthesia is triggered, processing of gustatory 
objects is stopped – the only taste-like phenomenology she has in those moments is due to her 
synesthesia (the mechanisms of which are part of her auditory mechanism). (2) When Lexi’s 
gustatory system is stimulated, her synesthesia does not take effect. It seems clear that in (1) the root 
beer phenomenology should be attributed to audition and not to (the sense of) taste and in (2) it 
should be attributed to taste rather than audition. But, again, RR7 associates it with both regardless of 
how Lexi’s synesthesia operates. And that means that clause (a) fails to satisfy constraint (4) just as 
clause (b) did in previous iterations of the rule. We have accepted that informational content plays a 
role in determining phenomenology to circumvent the problem for (b). Now we must do the same for 
(a): 
(RR8) That instance of F is associated with the modality individuated by Mm if, and only if, 
there is some stimulus R’ that is substantially similar to R and, were just Mm stimulated 
by R’, the resulting experience E’ would either:  
(a) have a corresponding instance of F, where  
(i) the instance of F in E was (partially) determined by information carried 
by Mm or  
(b) have a corresponding instance of a feature F’ that is a determinate of the same 
determinable as F, provided that 
(i) Mm inherits information from some other mechanism Mk in the course of 
sub-experiential sensory processing (resulting in E) and 
(ii) Mm uses that information in determining the instance of F (in E), as a 
feature of one of Mm’s perceptual objects. 
 
It will be helpful, in assessing RR8, to take a step back and remember why we are looking for an 
association rule in the first place. Primarily, we wanted an association rule to adjudicate the novel 
feature debate. We were interested in novel features because we were worried that theorizing about 
perceptual experience in a sense-by-sense manner would lead us to miss something crucial; namely, 
those features not explainable in terms of the individual (Aristotelian) senses. Now notice that, 
applying RR8 – and so using it to adjudicate the novel feature debate – requires a complete 
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accounting of the flow of information through the sensory mechanisms and an account of when that 
information manifests consciously (both as representational content and phenomenal features). But, if 
we have this, we haven’t left any features unexplained. It’s just that the explanation doesn’t appeal to 
the Aristotelian senses, it appeals to sensory mechanisms. 
 One might think that there is at least one theoretically interesting class of features in the 
vicinity of novel features that RR8 will reveal; namely, emergent features – i.e., informational 
content derived from multiple mechanisms, but not found in any of those mechanisms themselves, 
and phenomenal features supervening on this emergent information. Perhaps emergent features can 
be leveraged into a defense of novel features. Notice, though, that emergent information and features 
arise within as well as across the (acceptable demarcations of the) mechanisms of our pre-theoretical 
conceptions of the Aristotelian senses. For example, there is a chemoreceptor on the tongue that, 
when stimulated in isolation, contributes no phenomenal features. However, when it is stimulated 
along with gustatory receptors that do contribute phenomenal taste features, emergent features (called 
‘kokumi’) result. These features include a strengthening of the basic tastes and features that are not 
entirely characterizable in terms of those basic tastes – e.g., ‘heartiness’.51 Kokumi receptors are part 
of the primary receptor of taste (i.e., they are chemoreceptors found on the tongue). And yet the 
result of a kokumi experience includes features that are more than the sum of the contributions of the 
sub-mechanisms giving rise to them – there is more to kokumi experience than one gets from the 
stimulation of any of the chemoreceptors of taste taken in isolation. 
 Given this, novel features will be a subset of emergent features. They are those emergent 
features that emerge from the interaction of sensory mechanisms we associate with distinct 
Aristotelian senses. If emergent features are going to form the basis of a defense of novel features, 
 
51 See Ohsu et al. (2010), Ueda et al. (1990); see also Brennan, Davies, Schepelmann, and Riccardi (2014), 
Maruyama, Yasuda, Kuroda, and Eto (2012), Yamamoto et al. (2020), Yang, Bai, Zeng, and Cui (2019). A plausible 
candidate for the emergent information on which the kokumi phenomenology supervenes is information pertaining 
to expected caloric content (Tang, Tan, Teo, and Forde 2020). 
  35 
the classification of some emergent features as novel will need to add explanatory power to our 
theory of perception. But the further classification of emergent features as novel will not add any 
explanatory power to our theory of perception: Once we are in a position to apply RR8, with its 
attendant account of emergent features, we have accounted for all the features arising from the 
sensory mechanisms (however demarcated from one another). And the senses, themselves, are to be 
individuated in terms of their mechanisms. So, the further classification of emergent features as novel 
is nothing more than an attempt to carve the results of RR8 to match pre-theoretical intuitions about 
the senses. (While intuition matching can be used to evaluate theoretical proposals, there is no 
theoretical value to intuition matching qua intuition matching.) 
 To illustrate, suppose that it were discovered that the putative novel feature involved in the 
experience of mintiness is a ‘harmonizing’ of the features provided by taste, smell, and trigeminal 
stimulation. And suppose, in addition, that, like kokumi, this feature only emerges when a further 
chemoreceptor is activated – one that does not produce any phenomenal features when stimulated in 
isolation. Furthermore, these (hypothetical) chemoreceptors are found midway between the gustatory 
receptors and the olfactory receptors – somewhere between the soft palate and the back of the nasal 
cavity – so that it is not entirely clear whether or not they belong to taste, smell, or neither. The flavor 
feature described here is certainly emergent. Whether or not it is novel depends on whether we 
attribute the hypothetical receptor to one of the Aristotelian senses. If, for example, we attribute the 
receptor to taste, then the feature will not be novel – it will be analogous to kokumi: the 
‘harmoniousness’ will be associated with taste, though it ‘harmonizes’ features from multiple senses. 
If we don’t attribute it to any Aristotelian sense, it will be novel. But choosing between these options 
doesn’t have and further repercussions for our theorizing about mintiness. In particular, the 
classification of mintiness as novel, should we choose that option, does not help us explain anything 
further about the experience of mintiness. 
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So the appeal to emergent features cannot be leveraged into a defense of novel features. But 
that was our last hope for finding a theoretical use for novel features. In short, RR8 renders the 
debate we were hoping to illuminate irrelevant. And so it fails to meet our third constraint, that the 
association rule make the novel feature debate substantive. 
One might think this means we should look for a further tweak to the association rule that 
will fix these problems or for another way to formulate an association rule, other than our 
counterfactual strategy.52 I am inclined to draw a different lesson: Multisensory experience (as 
construed in the novel feature debate) is a red herring – or, rather, a ladder to be kicked away. It was 
a useful step in philosophy of perception’s recent march from a single-minded focus on vision 
through a broadened focus inclusive of other Aristotelian senses to the eventual recognition that these 
senses (intuitively construed) won’t be useful in theorizing about perceptual experience. But having 
arrived at this point, we have no further use for novel features or multisensory accounts of 
perception.  
Furthermore, we also wanted an association rule to determine the preferred individuation of 
the Aristotelian senses – at least for the novel feature debate. We just saw that none of our 
association rules met all four constraints. If this result for the novel feature debate generalizes, then 
there will be no good rule for determining the preferred demarcation of the mechanisms of the 
Aristotelian senses for the purposes of theorizing about the features of perceptual experiences. 
 
6. The problem generalizes 
In fact, the failure to find an adequate association rule for the novel feature debate does generalize to 
any debate that takes the pre-theoretical notions of the Aristotelian senses as a starting point for 
 
52 Regarding the counterfactual strategy, the only room left to maneuver concerns what it is to count as a result of 
the stimulation of a mechanism, but we’ve covered all the obvious ground there. Any further proposal will be both 
ad hoc and unlikely to help. 
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theorizing about the contents and phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Any such debate 
needs an association rule that meets our four constraints (modifying the third constraint to apply to 
whichever debate is under consideration). But none of our association rules satisfied all four criteria. 
Perhaps, given that RR8 only ran afoul of the third constraint (to render the novel feature debate 
substantive), it will be useful for one of these other debates. If RR8 is going to be an acceptable 
association rule for one of these debates, then it will have to render that debate substantive. But RR8 
clearly won’t render any of these debates substantive because – as we’ve seen – all the explanatory 
work regarding the contents and phenomenal character of perception is already done by the time we 
are able to apply RR8.  
Take the thick or thin contents debate, for example. The debate is over whether kind 
properties, such as being a pine tree, are ever contents of a perceptual (usually visual) experience. 
Insofar as the arguments in favor of thick contents rely on phenomenal contrast cases implicating a 
specific modality (e.g., Siegel 2006), we will need an association rule that tells us, for each kind 
property in the contents of a conscious experience, whether or not its correlated phenomenal 
character is associated with a sensory modality (such as vision).53 RR8 will be able to do this, but 
once we are in a position to apply RR8 we will already know all there is to know about which 
demarcations of, e.g., the visual mechanism carry which contents and result in which phenomenal 
features. Those who favor thick contents will prefer a demarcation of the visual mechanism that 
associates the phenomenal features correlated with certain kind properties with vision. Those who 
favor a thin account will prefer a demarcation that doesn’t. As with the novel feature debate, picking 
one demarcation over the other will have no further implications for any of our theorizing about 
perceptual content and phenomenology, though. All that theorizing will have already been done. 
 
53 One could, of course, pursue the thick/thin debate without adverting to specific sensory modalities. But this is just 
to concede the point that our pre-theoretical notions of the senses are not an adequate basis for theorizing about such 
matters. 
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A final comment: I am not saying that there could be no theoretical use for our pre-theoretical 
notions of the senses, just that there will be none with respect to explaining perceptual content and 
phenomenology. Nor am I saying that we should abandon any differentiation of the sensory 
mechanisms and focus just on a single modality, perceiving, in our explanations of content and 
phenomenology (as Speaks (2015) suggests).54 My approach is more akin to the sensory pluralism of 
Macpherson (2011b, 2011c) and Fulkerson (2014), minus the extra step of declaring some 
demarcations of the sensory mechanisms to be versions of the Aristotelian senses. I omit the step 
because it adds nothing to the explanatory power of our perceptual theories. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I have argued that any association rule that will be acceptable for the purposes of informing the novel 
feature debate must meet four requirements: (1) It must answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question ‘Is this 
feature associated with that modality?’ for every feature and modality. (2) It must conform to our 
guiding intuitions regarding the correct associations of proper sensibles and the results of cross-
modal recalibration effects. (3) It must render the debate substantive. (4) It must appeal to the 
stimulation states of sensory mechanisms. 
 Given the general form of such a rule – roughly, a feature of a perceptual experience belongs 
to a given modality if, and only if, it could/would result from the stimulation of that modality in a 
unimodal experience – alterations can be made along the dimensions of (a) the demarcation of the 
sensory mechanisms by which we individuate the sensory modalities, (b) the stimulation received by 
that mechanism, and (c) what counts as a result of the stimulation of that mechanism. It was found 
that no variation on these parameters can satisfy all the constraints for an adequate association rule. 
Without an association rule we have no way to adjudicate the novel feature debate. Furthermore, our 
 
54 Indeed, the results canvased here suggest that the relevant mechanisms won’t divide into perceptual and 
conceptual any more neatly than they will divide into perceptual modalities. 
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attempt to find an adequate association rule revealed that novel features are not an interesting 
theoretical notion.  
The failure to find an adequate association rule generalizes, undermining any attempt to 
theorize about the contents and phenomenal character of perception in terms of the Aristotelian 
senses. It is time to slough off the remaining baggage of the sense-by-sense approach to theorizing 
about the features of perceptual experiences in favor of an approach that proceeds, not by appeal to 
under-defined notions of the sensory modalities, but in terms of the precisely demarcated sensory 
mechanisms. Doing so will be illuminating for a number of philosophical debates about perception. 
To cite a few that have received passing mention here: (1) Whether or not we need a Kantian 
intuition of space to have spatial perception, (2) the thick/thin contents of perceptual experience, and 
(3) a naturalistic account of the contents and phenomenology of perceptual experiences.  
 The discussion here has already suggested how we might proceed with this project. The first 
step is to account for the informational contents carried in the perceptual mechanisms and how that 
informational content relates to the representational contents of perception. A good bit of work has 
already been done in this area, though there is certainly more to accomplish (e.g., Neander 2017; 
Shea 2018). The second step is to explain the relationship between phenomenology and 
informational/representational content. If phenomenology is determined by content or by content + 
mechanism, then we will be able to account for all the features of perceptual experiences once we 
have completed the first step. Even if it isn't, there is certainly a close connection between the content 
and phenomenology of a perceptual experience, so we will have gone some way towards explaining 
phenomenology once we have sorted the issues concerning mechanisms and contents. Furthermore, 
by focusing on clearly demarcated mechanisms, we make the question of the phenomenology of an 
experience resulting from the operation of that mechanism empirically tractable – at least in 
principle. We only need the means of isolating that mechanism and testing its deliverances (in light 
of our theories of informational content, representation, and phenomenology). This is not something 
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that our pre-theoretical notions of the senses afford, given the uncertainty about how precisely to 
demarcate their mechanisms. 
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Appendix 
Tables summarizing the association rules, how they fared with respect to the four constraints on an 
acceptable association rule, and – for those that failed to satisfy constraint 2 (regarding our guiding 
feature association intuitions), how they fared with respect to intuitions concerning proper sensibles, the 
McGurk effect, and the ventriloquism effect, are given below. 
 
 
 demarcation of the 
sensory mechanisms 
what is the relevant stimulation 
for assessing the counterfactual? 
what counts as a result of stimulation of 
that mechanism? 
OCR indeterminate equivalent to actual what could result 
RR1 determinate equivalent to actual what could result 
RR2 determinate equivalent to actual what would result 
RR3 determinate substantially similar to actual what would result 
RR4 determinate unconstrained what would result 
RR5 determinate substantially similar to actual what would result but allowing differences 
in determinate of same determinable 
RR6 determinate substantially similar to actual what would result but allowing restricted 
feature inheritance from other mechanisms 
RR7 determinate substantially similar to actual what would result but allowing restricted 
inheritance of information from other 
mechanisms, with phenomenology 
supervening on informational 
content+modality 
RR8 determinate substantially similar to actual what would result, provided what did 
result was (partially determined by 
information carried in the mechanism) but 
allowing restricted inheritance of 
information as in RR7 
 
Table 1. Summary of the association rules considered herein is given, with respect 
to the dimensions along which those rules varied. 
 
 
 Rules on every feature for 
each modality 
Satisfies guiding 
intuitions 
Makes novel 
feature debate 
substantive 
Sufficiently grounded in 
stimulation states of 
mechanisms 
OCR no no yes no 
RR1 yes no yes yes 
RR2 yes no yes yes 
RR3 yes no yes yes 
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 Rules on every feature for 
each modality 
Satisfies guiding 
intuitions 
Makes novel 
feature debate 
substantive 
Sufficiently grounded in 
stimulation states of 
mechanisms 
RR4 yes no yes yes 
RR5 yes uncertain yes no 
RR6 yes, but circular yes, but circular yes no 
RR7 yes, pending theoretical 
results 
uncertain no no 
RR8 yes uncertain no yes 
 
Table 2a. Summary of results for each association rule with respect to the four 
constraints on an acceptable association rule. 
 
 
 Proper Sensibles McGurk Effect Ventriloquism Effect 
Intuition non-novel, unique to a modality auditory auditory 
OCR non-novel, not unique auditory auditory 
RR1 non-novel, not unique auditory auditory 
RR2 non-novel, unique non-auditory non-auditory 
RR3 non-novel, unique auditory non-auditory 
RR4 non-novel, unique auditory non-auditory 
 
Table 2b. A comparison of the guiding feature association intuitions for the 
relevant features in our test cases and the results for those association rules that 
were rejected for failing to satisfy this constraint. (These results apply to our 
generalized notion of an acceptable demarcation of the sensory mechanisms.) 
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